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Abstract3
What are the e¤ects of cyclical scal policy on industry growth? We show that industries with4
a relatively heavier reliance on external nance or lower asset tangibility tend to grow faster (in5
terms of both value added and of labor productivity growth) in countries that implement 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1. Introduction1
Standard macroeconomic textbooks generally separate the analysis of long-run growth2
from that of short-term growth. Long-run growth is linked to structural characteristics of3
the economy (education, R&D, openness to trade, nancial development) while the short-4
term analysis emphasizes the short-term e¤ects of supply or demand shocks and the e¤ects5
of macroeconomic policies (scal and/or monetary) aimed at stabilizing the economy. Yet6
the view that short-run stabilization policies should have no signicant impact on long-run7
growth has been challenged by several empirical papers, notably Ramey and Ramey (1995),8
who nd a negative correlation in cross-country regression between volatility and long-run9
growth.1 More recently, using a Schumpeterian growth framework, Aghion et al (2010) have10
argued that higher macroeconomic volatility a¤ects the composition of rmsinvestments11
and, in particular, pushes towards more procyclical R&D investments in rms that are more12
credit-constrained.13
This paper takes a further step by analyzing the e¤ect of stabilizing scal policy on14
(industrial) growth, and how this e¤ect depends upon the nancial constraints faced by the15
industry. The rst part of the paper builds on Aghion et al (2010) to sketch the theoretical16
argument that rationalizes our empirical strategy and predictions. In this framework, rms17
can invest either in short-run projects, or in productivity-enhancing long-term projects (e.g.18
R&D investments). Short-term projects face an aggregate productivity shock while the19
completion of long-term innovative projects is subject to a liquidity risk: such projects fail20
to deliver output and increase knowledge if some reinvestment is not carried out during the21
interim period. Reinvestment needs can then be met using output from short-term projects22
and/or through borrowing on the capital market. Yet because of credit market imperfections,23
a fraction of rms in the industry can only use retained earnings to meet their reinvestment24
needs.25
1Additional evidence can be found in Bruno (1993) on ination and growth or more recently, Imbs (2007).
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Then if credit market imperfections bind only in the low state of the world, reducing1
the volatility of aggregate shocks increases the likelihood that long-term projects survive2
liquidity shocks in the bad state without a¤ecting what happens in the good state where3
credit constraints do not bind. Moreover, the higher the fraction of credit constrained rms,4
the larger the positive e¤ect from reducing aggregate volatility on the equilibrium fraction of5
long-term projects that survive liquidity shocks. A countercyclical scal policy that reduces6
aggregate volatility should therefore have a positive impact on the growth rate of more7
credit-constrained industries.28
The second part of the paper takes this prediction to the data. Departing from the9
existing empirical literature on volatility and growth, which relies mainly on cross-country10
regressions, the paper follows the methodology developed in Rajan and Zingales (1998). We11
use cross-country/cross-industry panel data on a sample of 15 OECD countries over the pe-12
riod 19802005, to test whether industry growth is signicantly a¤ected by the interaction13
between scal policy countercyclicality (computed for each country) and external nancial14
dependence or asset tangibility (measured for the corresponding industry in the US). Figure15
1 summarizes our main ndings: it plots value added growth for a set of manufacturing in-16
dustries as a function of total scal balance to potential GDP countercyclicality, controlling17
for initial industry size. The left-hand panel in Figure 1 depicts this relationship for indus-18
tries with below-median levels of nancial dependence, whereas the right-hand panel plots19
this relationship for industries with above-median levels of nancial dependence.3 A more20
2See Aghion et al (2011) for rm-level evidence of an asymmetric e¤ect of credit constraints on R&D over
a rms business cycle.
3More precisely, the estimated equation is gi;c = i + fpc    log yi;c + "i;c, where gi;c is the average
growth in real value added in industry i in country c for the period 19802005, i is a full set of industry
dummies, fpc is scal policy countercyclicality (here, the output gap sensitivity of total scal balance to
potential GDP) for the period 19802005, yi;c is the ratio of value added in industry i in country c to total
manufacturing valued added in country c in 1980. Parameters for estimation are i,  and , while "i;c
is a residual. This equation is estimated separately for industries with below-median nancial dependence
and with above-median nancial dependence. For the former, the estimated coe¢ cient  is  :25 and is
insignicant at standard condence levels. For the latter, the estimated coe¢ cient  is 2:32 and is signicant
at standard condence levels (5% level).
Cyclical Fiscal Policy, Credit Constraints, and Industry Growth 4
countercyclical scal policy has virtually no e¤ect on value added growth for industries with1
below-median levels of nancial dependence, i.e. those that face milder credit constraints.2
On the contrary, a more countercyclical scal policy has a positive and signicant impact on3
real value added growth for industries with above median-levels of nancial dependence, i.e.4
with tighter credit constraints. Using the same methodology, a similar type of result can be5
derived by decomposing the sample between industries with below-median asset tangibility6
from industries and above-median asset tangibility.7
The empirical analysis in this paper aims at establishing the robustness of these ndings.8
The empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, scal policy countercyclicality 9
measured as the sensitivity of a countrys total or primary scal balance (relative to GDP)10
to time variations in its output gap has a more positive and signicant impact on industry11
growth the higher the corresponding US industrys reliance on external nance, or the lower12
its degree of asset tangibility. This result holds whether industry growth is measured by real13
value added growth or by labor productivity growth. Moreover, the e¤ect of the interaction14
between industry nancial constraints and countercyclical scal policy on growth is stronger15
and more signicant in slumps than in booms, which in turn echoes the asymmetry between16
good and bad states emphasized in the theoretical argument.17
One can then assess the magnitude of the corresponding di¤erence-in-di¤erence e¤ect,18
i.e. how much extra growth is generated when scal policy countercyclicality and nancial19
constraints move from the rst to the third quartile. The gures happen to be relatively20
large, especially when compared to the equivalent gures in Rajan and Zingales (1998). This,21
in turn, suggests that the e¤ect of a more countercyclical scal policy in more nancially22
constrained industries is economically signicant. Next, we show that our baseline result is23
robust to: (i) adding control variables such as nancial development, ination, and average24
scal balance interacted with the industry measures of nancial constraints; (ii) taking into25
account the uncertainty around scal policy cyclicality estimates; (iii) instrumenting scal26
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policy cyclicality with economic, legal and political variables.41
What is gained by moving from cross-country to cross-industry analysis? A pure cross-2
country analysis raises at least three issues. First, the cyclicality of scal policy is typically3
captured by a unique time-invariant parameter which only varies across countries. As a4
result, standard cross-country panel regression cannot be used to assess the e¤ect of the5
cyclical pattern of scal policy on growth inasmuch as the former is perfectly collinear to the6
xed e¤ect that is traditionally introduced to control for unobserved cross-country hetero-7
geneity.5 Second, the causality issue (does scal policy cyclicality have an impact on growth8
or does growth a¤ect the cyclical pattern of scal policy) cannot be properly addressed while9
keeping the analysis at a purely macroeconomic level.6 A nal concern is identication: a10
cross-country panel regression, particularly one which is restricted to a small cross-country11
sample, is unlikely to be robust to the inclusion of additional control variables reecting al-12
ternative stories. Thus, even if cross-country panel regressions point to correlations between13
the cyclical pattern of scal policy and growth, the channel through which this correlation14
works is unlikely to be well identied.15
Our industry-level analysis helps us address these concerns. First, even though the coun-16
tercyclicality of scal policy is estimated at the country level with a time-invariant coe¢ cient,17
which implies that scal policy countercyclicality in each country is collinear to that coun-18
trys xed e¤ect, the interaction between the country-level measure of countercyclicality and19
the industry level variable is not. Second, at the cross-industry level, there are enough obser-20
vations to ensure that the results withstand the introduction of country and industry xed21
e¤ects plus a whole set of structural variables as additional controls. Finally, macroeconomic22
4Other robustness checks have been carried out but are not presented here for the sake of brevity. These
have included, for example, the use of alternative measures of scal policy cyclicality.
5To overcome this problem, Aghion and Marinescu (2007) introduce time-varying estimates of scal policy
cyclicality. While this helps to control for unobserved heterogeneity, it comes at the cost of losing precision
in the estimates of scal policy cyclicality.
6One particular reason for this is that scal policy cyclicality is used in growth regressions as a right-hand
side variable while the estimation of time-varying scal policy cyclicality requires the full data sample to be
used. See Aghion and Marinescu (2007).
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policy should a¤ect industry-level growth whereas the opposite industry-level growth af-1
fecting macroeconomic policy is less likely to hold. Thus, the presence of a positive and2
signicant interaction coe¢ cient in the industry-level regressions is more likely to reect a3
causal impact of the cyclical pattern of scal policy on growth.7 However, there is a downside4
to the industry-level investigation: namely, that our cross-country/cross-industry di¤erences-5
in-di¤erences analysis has little to say about the aggregate magnitude of the macroeconomic6
growth gain/loss induced by di¤erent patterns of cyclicality in scal policy.87
The analysis in this paper contributes to at least three ongoing debates among macro-8
economists: 1) is there a (causal) link between volatility and growth?; 2) what is the rationale9
for pursuing a countercyclical scal policy; and 3) what are the e¤ects of a countercyclical10
scal stimulus on aggregate output? On the rst aspect, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)11
stress that the correlation between long-term growth and volatility is not entirely causal,12
pointing to low nancial development as a factor that could both reduce long-run growth13
and increase the volatility of the economy. More recently, Acemoglu et al (2003) and East-14
erly (2005) hold that both high volatility and low long-run growth arise not directly from15
policy decisions but rather from bad institutions. However, scal policy cyclicality varies16
signicantly even among OECD countries (Lane, 2003) that share similar institutions. And17
our own nding also speaks to the importance of cyclical scal policy, over and above the18
e¤ect of more structural variables. As mentioned previously, Aghion et al (2010) defend the19
view that higher volatility should induce lower growth by discouraging long-term growth-20
enhancing investments, particularly in more credit-constrained rms. Aghion et al (2009)21
build on that insight when analyzing the relationship between long-run growth and the choice22
7Fiscal policy cyclicality could depend on the industry composition of total output if, for example, indus-
tries that benet more from a countercyclical scal policy countercyclicality lobby more intensely for such
a policy. However, to the extent that there are decreasing returns to scale (which is likely to be the case in
the manufacturing industries featured in our empirical analysis), this would rather imply a downward bias
in our estimates of the positive impact of scal policy countercyclicality on growth. Hence, controlling for
this possible source of endogeneity would only reinforce our conclusions by reducing this downward bias.
8The fact that we focus on manufacturing industries, and leave out the service sector makes it even harder
to use our results to derive more aggregate numerical conclusions.
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of exchange-rate regime.91
On the second aspect, the case for a countercyclical scal policy was most forcefully made2
by Barro (1979): it helps smooth out intertemporal consumption when production is a¤ected3
by exogenous shocks, thereby improving welfare. Another justication for countercyclical4
scal policy stems from a more Keynesian view of the cycle: namely, to the extent that a5
recession corresponds to an increase in the ine¢ ciency of the economy, appropriate scal or6
monetary policy that raises aggregate demand can bring the economy closer to the e¢ cient7
level of production (see Galí et al, 2007). The e¤ect of scal policy in our framework is8
di¤erent: a countercyclical scal policy, by reducing aggregate volatility can induce rms to9
devote more investment to long-term projects, as innovations will then pay out more.10
Finally, an extended literature looks at the short-run output response to an exogenous11
increase in government spending or to a tax cut. Importantly in these papers, GDP is12
usually detrended, so that all long-run e¤ects are shut down. Although most economists13
would agree that a scal shock should increase short-run output, there is no consensus on14
the magnitude of the e¤ect.10 In particular, papers that introduce rational expectations and15
long-run wealth e¤ects will typically predict a lower value of the multiplier (based on the16
idea that consumers anticipate that an increase in government spending today is likely to17
result in an increase in taxes tomorrow).11 The paper moves beyond this debate by looking18
only at the long-run e¤ect of a more countercyclical scal policy: even if the short-run e¤ect19
9See Aghion et al. (1999) and Aghion and Howitt (2009, ch14) for more complete literature reviews on
the link between volatility and long-run growth.
10Skeptical views on the importance of the e¤ect of scal shocks include Mountford and Uhlig (2009) or
Perotti (2005). On the other hand, Fatás and Mihov (2001) nd that an increase in government spending in-
duces increases in consumption and employment. Romer and Romer (2010) nd that exogenous tax increases
are highly contractionary. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) show that both increases in government spending
and tax cuts have a positive e¤ect on GDP, but that scal policy shocks have a negative e¤ect on investment;
this does not contradict our theory which points at investments being directed towards more productivity
enhancing projects as the channel whereby long-run growth is enhanced by a more countercyclical scal
policy.
11For example Cogan et al (2010) compute the e¤ect of a permanent increase in government expenditure
by 1% of GDP as of 2009: by 2011 Q4, they nd that the increase in GDP is only equal to 0.44%, whereas
Romer and Bernstein (2009) nd a 1.57% increase.
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of a more countercyclical policy were more in line with the prediction of low multipliers, our1
results point to economically signicant long-run e¤ects.2
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the outline of3
the argument for our main prediction. Section 3 describes the econometric methodology and4
the data sources used in our estimations. Section 4 presents our empirical results. Section 55
discusses their robustness. Section 6 concludes.6
2. The argument in a nutshell7
The argument can be formulated using a toy version of the model in Aghion et al (2010).8
Consider a dynamic economy in discrete time populated by a continuum of two-period lived9
entrepreneurs of mass 1. Let us denote by Tt the knowledge level at date t. Productivity10
At at date t is given by At = atTt, where at is random variable with support fa; ag where11
the high value a represents a good productivity shock (high state) whereas the low value a12
represents a bad productivity shock (low state).13
Entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and consume only in the last period of their lives. Each14
entrepreneur born at date t is endowed with the same initial wealthWt = wTt which she can15
allocate between a short-run capital investment, Kt = kTt and a long-term growth-enhancing16
(e.g. R&D) investment Zt = zTt, so that w = z + k.17
Entrepreneurs decide on the amount of short-term and long-term investment before the18
state of the world is revealed. The short-run investment yields prots t = at(k)Tt at the19
end of the rst period, whereas the long-term growth-enhancing investment yields a long-20
term vt+1Tt with probability z in the second period provided the entrepreneur survives a21
liquidity shock Ct = ecTt occurring at the end of the rst period. These liquidity shocks22
are idiosyncratic, i.e. some entrepreneurs are lucky and only need to cover a low realization23
of the liquidity cost Ct, whereas other entrepreneurs are less lucky and must incur a high24
realization of Ct. Ex ante, entrepreneurs face the same uncertainty over the realization of ec,25
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and for simplicity ec is uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1].121
In the absence of credit constraints, rms can borrow up to the net present value of their2
(long-term) prots. Hence, if vt+1 is su¢ ciently large, rms can always cover their liquidity3
costs and survive into the second period t+1. Let us assume, however, that only a fraction 4
of rms have access to capital markets, the other rms need to renance their project using5
their own cash-ow only, so that for these rms only a fraction ft of the projects survive6
the liquidity shock, with ft = Pr(at(k)  ec) = min (at (k) ; 1). Think of the variable  as7
capturing the fraction of rms with highly tangible assets or with low reliance on external8
nance: thus the higher , the less rms in the sector are prone to be credit-constrained.9
Firms learn whether they have access to the nancial markets before they make their10
investment. Since long-term projects always survive the liquidity shock for rms with access11
to the nancial market (we refer to those as "unconstrained rms") unlike the other ("con-12
strained") rms, the former will invest more in long-term projects than the latter. Denote13
znc and zc the levels of investment in long-term projects respectively by unconstrained and14
constrained rms in equilibrium: these investment levels then satisfy znc > zc.15
Finally knowledge growth from one period to the next depends on the fraction of long-
term projects that survive the liquidity shocks. Namely:
lnTt+1   lnTt =  (znc + (1  ) zc min (at (w   zc) ; 1)) : (1)
where z is the innovation rate of a surviving rm that has allocated z to long-term invest-16
ment at the beginning of the rst period.17
Let us restrict attention to aggregate shocks realizations (a; a) such that the credit con-
straint does not bind for at = a. In that case, one can easily show that a mean preserving
12The analysis in this section extends straighforwardly to more general continuous distributions with
concave cumulative distribution functions.
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spread of the at distribution will reduce the expected growth rate
g = Ea[lnTt+1   lnTt]; (2)
under the reasonable assumption that z (w   z) is increasing around the equilibrium value1
zc (which is true for  su¢ ciently small so that zc is also small). Indeed, for given z, the ex2
post growth rate is reduced in the low state a while it is not a¤ected in the high state. In3
addition, such a mean preserving spread of the at distribution will discourage constrained4
rms to engage in long-term innovative investment z since such an investment is less likely5
to be successful in the low-state of the world, whereas this mean preserving spread will6
not a¤ect long-term investment by unconstrained rms. This, in turn, further reduces the7
expected growth rate g.8
A higher fraction of credit constrained rms, i.e. a lower , will also reduce expected
growth since constrained rms invest less in long-term projects. Finally, a mean-preserving
spread of the at distribution will reduce the expected growth rate g more the higher the
fraction of credit constrained rms in the sector as it a¤ects only these rms. Hence long-
term investments and therefore the expected growth rate are more negatively a¤ected by
aggregate volatility when the number of unconstrained rms  is lower. Denoting by  the
variance of the aggregate shock, one then gets:13
@g
@
> 0,
@g
@
< 0 and
@2g
@@
> 0: (3)
Overall, under realistic assumptions on the prot function, a countercyclical scal policy9
aimed at reducing aggregate volatility should have a more growth-enhancing e¤ect in sectors10
with a larger fraction of credit constrained rms, thus typically in sectors which depend11
more on external nance or where asset tangibility is lower on average. Moreover, this e¤ect12
13See the Supplementary Material available online for details.
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should be mainly driven by the fact that credit-constrained rms react more to increased1
aggregate volatility in downturns than in upturns.14 These are the main predictions which2
are being tested in the remaining part of the paper.3
3. Econometric methodology and data4
Can di¤erences in scal policy cyclicality across countries and in nancial constraints
across industries account for cross-country, cross-industry growth di¤erences? To answer
this question, we use the methodology proposed in Rajan and Zingales (1998). There, the
dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real value added or labor productivity
in industry i in country c for a given period of time, say [t; t+n].15,16 The original specication
includes, as the main explanatory variable, the interaction between industry is degree of
nancial constraints (fci) which will be measured with external nancial dependence or asset
tangibility (see below), and the degree of nancial development (fdc) in country c over the
period [t; t+ n]. Moreover a full set of industry and country dummies fi; cg to control
for unobserved heterogeneity across industries and across countries as well as a control
variable for initial conditions log yti;c are included on the right-hand side (henceforth, RHS).
17
14The same prediction also obtains in a variant of the model where the investment decision is taken after
the aggregate productivity shock is realized. In that case one can show that @g@ > 0 and
@2g
@@ > 0 still
hold and that @g@ < 0 provided that 
02= ( 00) is increasing. This latter condition is satised for example
when  (k) = k with  2 (0; 1). If it does not hold, a mean-preserving spread of at increases the number
of surviving projects for unconstrained rms only, so that the overall impact on the growth rate depends on
the share of unconstrained rms.
15Labor productivity is dened as the ratio of real value added to employment. While we also have
access to industry level data on hours worked, we choose to focus on productivity per worker rather than on
productivity per hour as measurement error is more likely to a¤ect the latter than the former.
16Note that this paper is the rst to investigate the determinants of labor productivity growth using
industry-level data. Neither Rajan and Zingales (1998) nor subsequent papers have looked at productivity
growth. Rather, they limited their focus to value added growth. A second novelty of this paper is that
labor productivity is computed using value added in volume terms while all previous studies use value added
in value terms, on the basis that price deators are similar for industries of a same country. Our dataset
includes price deators that are both country- and industry-specic.
17The variable yti;c is the beginning of period ratio of labor productivity (resp. value added) in industry
i in country c to total manufacturing labor productivity (resp. total manufacturing real value added) in
country c when the dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of labor productivity (resp. real
value added).
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We extend this framework by adding on the RHS our variable of interest (fci)(fpc), namely
the interaction between industry is degree of nancial constraint (fci) and the degree of scal
policy (counter-) cyclicality (fpc) in country c over the period [t; t+ n]. Denoting "i;c the
error term, our main estimation equation also referred to as the second stage regression 
can then be expressed as:
gi;c = i + c +  (fci) (fdc) +  (fci) (fpc)   log yti;c + "i;c (4)
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998) industry nancial constraints are measured using rm-1
level data for the US. External nancial dependence is measured as the median across all2
rms in a given industry of the ratio of total capital expenditures minus current cash ow to3
total capital expenditures. Asset tangibility is measured as the median across all rms in a4
given industry of the ratio of the value of net property, plant and equipment to total assets.5
These two variables are computed with data for the period 19801989. This methodology is6
predicated on the assumptions that: (i) di¤erences in nancial dependence/asset tangibility7
across industries are largely driven by di¤erences in technology; (ii) technological di¤erences8
persist over time across countries; (iii) countries are relatively similar in terms of the overall9
institutional environment faced by rms. Under those three assumptions, the US-based10
industry-specic measure is likely to be a valid interactor for industries in countries other11
than the US.18 Now, there are good reasons to believe that these assumptions are satised12
particularly if the empirical analysis is restricted to a sample of OECD countries. For13
example, if pharmaceuticals require proportionally more external nance than textiles in the14
US, this is likely to be the case in other OECD countries.19 Moreover, since little convergence15
18Note however that this measure is unlikely to be useful for looking at the e¤ect of policy on US growth
as it likely reects the equilibrium of supply and demand for capital in the US and therefore is endogenous
to the growth process in the US economy.
19It should be stressed that the ordering of industries w.r.t. nancial dependence or asset tangibility is
assumed to be similar across di¤erent countries, not the specic values for nancial dependence or asset
tangibility of a given sector in di¤erent countries.
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has occurred among OECD countries over the past 20 years, cross-country di¤erences are1
likely to persist over time. Finally, to the extent that the US is more nancially developed2
than other countries worldwide, US-based measures of nancial dependence as well as asset3
tangibility are likely to provide the least noisy measures of industry level nancial dependence4
or asset tangibility.5
Let us now focus attention on how to measure nancial development and scal policy
cyclicality over the time interval [t; t+ n]. Financial development (fdc) can be assessed
relatively easily using standard measures developed in the literature such as the ratio of
private credit to GDP in each country. As an alternative, one can also use the ratio of
nancial system deposits to GDP in each country. Fiscal policy cyclicality (fpc) is more
di¢ cult to determine because it cannot be observed as there is no direct measure for it. One
hence needs an "auxiliary" equation which is also referred to as the rst stage regression 
to infer scal policy cyclicality for each country of the sample. Our approach is to estimate
scal policy cyclicality as the change in scal policy stemming from a given change in the
domestic output gap. Thus we use country-level data over the period [t; t+ n] to estimate
the following country-by-country "auxiliary" equation:
fbc; = c + fpczc; + uc; ; (5)
where: (i)  2 [t; t+ n] ; (ii) fbc; is a measure of scal policy in country c in year  : for6
example total scal balance to potential GDP; (iii) zc; measures the output gap in country c7
in year  , that is the percentage di¤erence between actual and potential GDP, and therefore8
represents the countrys current position in the cycle; (iv) c is a constant and uc; is an9
error term. Equation (5) is estimated separately for each country c in our sample. For10
example, if the ratio of scal balance to potential GDP is on the left-hand side (henceforth,11
LHS) of (5), a positive (resp. negative) regression coe¢ cient (fpc) reects a countercyclical12
(resp. pro-cyclical) scal policy as the countrys scal balance improves (resp. deteriorates)13
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in upturns (resp. in downturns). Note that it is helpful to consider scal policy indicators in1
regression (5) as ratios to potential and not current GDP to make sure that the cyclicality2
parameter (fpc) captures changes in the numerator related to scal policy rather than3
changes in the denominator related to cyclical variations in output .20,214
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we rely on a simple OLS procedure to estimate our5
second stage regression (4), correcting for heteroskedasticity bias whenever needed, with-6
out worrying much further about endogeneity issues. In particular, both interaction terms7
between industry-specic characteristics and scal policy cyclicality on the one hand and8
between industry specic characteristics and nancial development on the other hand are9
likely to be largely exogenous to the LHS variable, be it industry labor productivity or value10
added growth. First, industry-specic characteristics pertain to industries in the US while11
the growth variable on the LHS involves countries other than the US. Hence reverse causality12
whereby industry growth outside the US could a¤ect external nancial dependence or asset13
tangibility of industries in the US, seems quite implausible. Second, nancial development14
and scal policy cyclicality are measured at a macro level whereas the LHS variable is mea-15
sured at industry level, which again reduces the scope for reverse causality as long as each16
individual industry represents a small fraction of the economys total output. Yet, as an17
additional test that the results are not driven by endogeneity considerations, we provide IV18
regressions where we instrument for scal policy cyclicality.2219
20When data are available, we also measure scal policy using cyclically adjusted variables. In this case,
the cyclicality of scal policy results more directly from discretionary policy. Put di¤erently, cyclicality
stemming from automatic stabilizers is purged out. Unreported results available upon request are very
similar to the case where scal policy indicators are not cyclically adjusted.
21More elaborate scal policy specications can also be considered. In particular, following Galí et al
(2003), a debt stabilization motive as well as a control for scal policy persistence can be included on the
RHS of equation (5). Letting bc; denote the ratio of public debt to potential GDP in country c in year
 , scal policy cyclicality
 
fp2;c

over the period [t; t+ n] can be estimated using a modied "auxiliary"
equation as follows: fbc; = c + cfbc; 1 + fp2;czc; + cbc; 1 + vc; where zc; is the output gap in
country c in year  , fbc; 1 is the scal policy indicator in country c in year    1 and vc; is an error term.
Unreported results available upon request provide results that are very similar both quantitatively and
qualitatively to the case where scal policy cyclicality is inferred using the simple specication (5).
22Results from IV regressions show a large degree of similarity with those of OLS estimations, thereby
conrming that our basic empirical strategy properly addresses the endogeneity issue.
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Our data sample focuses on 15 industrialized OECD countries plus the US.23 Data for this1
country sample are available for the period 19802005.24 Industry-level real value added and2
labor productivity data are drawn from the EU KLEMS dataset (OMahony and Timmer,3
2009). We focus on manufacturing industries disaggregated at the two and three digit levels4
according to the International Standard Industrial Classication revision 3.1 (ISIC 3.1). The5
primary source of data for measuring industry nancial dependence and asset tangibility is6
Compustat, which compiles balance sheets and income statements for US-listed rms. More7
specically, the industry-level indicators are computed as in Raddatz (2006) for nancial8
dependence and as in and the industry-level indicators Braun and Larrain (2005) for asset9
tangibility. Fiscal and other macroeconomic variables are drawn from the OECD Economic10
Outlook database and from the World Bank Financial Development and Structure database11
(Beck et al, 2000).12
4. Results13
This section describes our empirical results. The rst stage regressions deliver estimates14
for scal policy cyclicality, then the second stage regressions show how countercyclical scal15
policy a¤ect growth more positively in sectors with higher nancial dependence or lower16
asset tangibility. Robustness checks are performed at the end of the section.17
4.1. Fiscal policy cyclicality estimates and industry nancial constraints18
The upper panel histogram in Figure 2 show the country by country estimates as well19
as the estimated condence interval at the 10% level for scal policy cyclicality when the20
dependent variable in equation (5) is the primary scal balance to potential GDP.25 The21
23List of countries in the sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great
Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden.
24We present here the empirical results related to the 19802005 period. Estimations on sub-samples with
shorter time span are available upon request.
25The condence interval at the 10% level is [m  1:645;m+ 1:645] where m and  respectively denote
the coe¢ cient (fpc) and standard error for the coe¢ cient (fpc) in equation (5) estimation.
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primary scal balance corresponds to the total scal balance from which interest payments1
to or from the government are excluded. According to these estimates, the most counter-2
cyclical countries in our sample are Sweden and Denmark. In these two countries, primary3
scal balance to potential GDP increases by nearly 1.7 percentage points in response to a 14
percentage point increase in the domestic output gap. The Swedish and Danish governments5
are therefore more likely to run a surplus when their respective economy experiences a boom6
(i.e. a positive output gap) and more likely to run a decit when their respective economy7
experiences a bust (i.e. a negative output gap). Conversely, the least countercyclical coun-8
tries or, put di¤erently, the most procyclical countries in our sample are Greece and Italy.9
In these two countries, the sensitivity of the ratio of primary scal balance to potential GDP10
to the domestic output gap is negative: the government runs a larger surplus or a lower11
decit, when the output gap decreases, i.e. when the economy deteriorates.12
Second, one can provide a snapshot of industry measures of nancial constraints. The13
lower panel histogram in Figure 2 indeed provides a subsample of the measures for nancial14
dependence and asset tangibility. O¢ ce, accounting and computing machinery (o¢ ce in Fig-15
ure 2, lower panel) on the one hand and radio, television and communication equipment and16
apparatus (radio in Figure 2, lower panel) on the other hand display the highest dependence17
on external nance.18
In these two sectors the median rm nances more than 70% of its capital expenditures19
through external funds. On the contrary, food products and beverages (food in Figure 2,20
lower panel) and tobacco products (tobacco in Figure 2, lower panel) display the lowest21
dependence on external nance. In these two sectors, nancial dependence is negative,22
meaning that the median rm earns cash ows that exceed capital expenditure. Turning to23
asset tangibility, this is largest for coke, rened petroleum products and nuclear fuel (coke in24
Figure 2, lower panel) and paper and paper products (paper in Figure 2, lower panel). More25
than 40% of assets are tangible assets in these two industries. By contrast, o¢ ce, accounting26
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and computing machinery (o¢ ce in Figure 2, lower panel) and medical, precision and optical1
instruments, watches and clocks (medical instruments in Figure 2, lower panel) display the2
lowest tangibility, with tangible assets accounting for no more than 20% of total assets.3
Last, let us investigate bivariate correlations between scal policy cyclicality and some4
macroeconomic variables. According to the upper left and middle panel in Figure 3, scal5
policy countercyclicality measured through the output gap sensitivity of total scal balance6
to potential GDP  is positively correlated with the average total scal balance to GDP7
and the average scal expenditures to GDP ratios. This suggests that countries with a8
more countercyclical scal policy are countries with higher levels of scal discipline and/or9
countries with a larger government. Next, the upper right and lower left panels in Figure10
3 show that scal policy countercyclicality correlates positively with average productivity11
growth but negatively with the volatility of productivity growth. This means that countries12
with a more countercyclical scal policy have on average experienced faster growth and lower13
volatility, consistent with the view that countercyclical scal policy should help stabilize the14
economy and thereby help it grow faster. Finally, the lower middle and lower right panels in15
Figure 3 show no systematic correlation between scal policy countercyclicality and nancial16
development, the latter being measured by average private credit to GDP or average nancial17
system deposits to GDP.18
4.2. The second stage estimation19
One can now estimate our main regression equation (4), with real value added growth as20
the LHS variable, using nancial dependence or asset tangibility as industry-specic inter-21
actors (table 1). Financial development is measured using either private credit to GDP or22
nancial system deposits to GDP. Fiscal policy cyclicality is estimated using alternatively the23
ratio of total or primary scal balance to potential GDP as the LHS variable in regression24
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(5).261
First, real value added growth is signicantly and positively (resp. negatively) correlated2
with the interaction of external nancial dependence (resp. asset tangibility) and scal policy3
countercyclicality. A larger sensitivity to the output gap of total scal balance to potential4
GDP raises industry real valued added growth the more so for industries with higher nancial5
dependence or lower asset tangibility. This result is robust to using primary instead of total6
scal balance: industries with larger nancial dependence or lower asset tangibility tend to7
benet more from a more countercyclical scal policy in the sense of a larger sensitivity of8
the primary scal balance to variations in the output gap. Estimated coe¢ cients are however9
smaller in absolute value when scal policy countercyclicality is estimated using the primary10
scal balance. This is related to the fact that the cross-country dispersion in the cyclicality11
of the primary scal balance is larger than the cross-country dispersion in the cyclicality12
of total scal balance. Second, real value added growth is signicantly correlated with the13
interaction of external nancial dependence (or asset tangibility) and nancial development14
but only when the latter is measured using nancial system deposits to GDP. Industries15
with higher external nancial dependence or lower asset tangibility e¤ectively benet more16
from higher nancial development as indicated by a larger ratio of nancial system deposits17
to GDP. But the result does not hold for private credit to GDP as the correlation between18
industry real value added growth and the interaction of private credit to GDP and nancial19
dependence or asset tangibility is never signicant at standard condence levels.20
Three remarks are worth making at this point. First, the estimated coe¢ cients for the21
interaction of scal policy countercyclicality and nancial dependence or asset tangibility are22
highly signicant in spite of the relatively conservative standard errors estimates which are23
clustered at the country level. Second, the pairwise correlation between industry nancial de-24
pendence and industry asset tangibility is around -0.6 which is signicantly below -1. In other25
26Unreported results using scal policy indicators as ratios of current and not potential GDP are very
similar and available upon request from the authors.
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words, these two variables are far from being perfectly negatively correlated, which in turn1
implies that the regressions with nancial dependence as the industry-specic characteristic2
are not just mirroring regressions where asset tangibility is the industry-specic character-3
istic. Instead these two set of regressions convey complementary information. Finally, the4
estimated coe¢ cients for the interaction term between industry nancial constraints and5
scal policy countercyclically remain essentially the same both in statistical signicance6
and economic magnitude whether the proxy for nancial development is private credit to7
GDP or nancial system deposits to GDP.8
One can repeat the same estimation exercise (Table 2), but taking labor productivity9
as the LHS variable in our main estimation equation (4). Comparing the results from this10
new set of regressions with the previous one will in turn allow us to decompose the overall11
e¤ect of scal policy countercyclicality on industry value added growth into employment12
growth and productivity growth. As is shown in Table 2, labor productivity growth is13
signicantly a¤ected by the interaction between nancial dependence/asset tangibility and14
scal policy cyclicality: a larger sensitivity to the output gap of total or primary scal15
balance to potential GDP raises industry labor productivity growth to a greater degree for16
industries with higher nancial dependence or lower asset tangibility. But the interaction17
of nancial dependence/asset tangibility and nancial development is never found to be18
signicant in accounting for industry labor productivity growth. In other words, the e¤ect19
of nancial development is limited to raising real value added growth without any e¤ect20
on labor productivity growth. On the contrary, scal policy cyclicality does a¤ect industry21
real value added growth and part of this e¤ect comes from its impact on labor productivity22
growth.23
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4.3. Magnitude of the e¤ects1
How large are the e¤ects implied by the above regressions? To get a sense of the magni-2
tudes involved, we compute the di¤erence in labor productivity growth gains for an industry3
whose external nancial dependence would increase from the 25th percentile to the 75th per-4
centile of the nancial dependence distribution when the country would increase the coun-5
tercyclicality of its scal policy from the 25th to the 75th percentile. Then, the same exercise6
is repeated, but replacing nancial dependence by asset tangibility (which moves from the7
75th to the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution).27 As is shown at the bottom of8
Table 2, the gain in productivity growth lies between 1.1 and 2.2 percentage points per year.9
These magnitudes are fairly large especially when compared to the corresponding gures in10
Rajan and Zingales (1998). According to their results, the di¤erence from moving from the11
25th to the 75th percentile in the level of nancial dependence and nancial development12
simultaneously, is roughly equal to 1 percentage point per year.13
However, the following considerations are worth pointing out. First, these are di¤erence-14
in-di¤erence (cross-country/cross industry) e¤ects, which are not interpretable as country-15
wide e¤ects.28 Second, we are looking only at manufacturing sectors, which represent less16
than 40% of total GDP of countries in our sample. Third, given the relatively small set of17
countries in our sample, there is a fairly large degree of dispersion in scal policy cyclicality18
across countries in our sample. Hence moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the19
countercyclicality of total or primary scal balance to potential GDP corresponds to a dra-20
matic change in the design of scal policy over the cycle, which in turn is unlikely to take21
place in any individual country over a short period of time. Fourth, this simple computation22
27The presence of industry and country xed e¤ects prevents us from evaluating the impact of a change
in scal policy cyclical pattern for a given industry or conversely from evaluating the e¤ect of a change in
industry characteristics (nancial dependence or asset tangibility) in a country with a given cyclical pattern
of scal policy.
28It could be that a more countercyclical scal policy simply redistributes growth across sectors without
any impact at the macro level, because the gains for some industries here the most nancially dependent
ones would be compensated by the loss for some others here the least nancially dependent industries.
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does not take into account the possible costs associated with the transition from a steady1
state with low scal countercyclicality to a steady state with high scal countercyclicality.2
Yet, the above exercise suggests that di¤erences in the cyclicality of scal policy are an im-3
portant driver of the observed cross-country/cross-industry di¤erences in value added and4
productivity growth.295
5. Robustness checks6
According to the above results, only scal policy cyclicality seems to have a signicant
e¤ect on industry labor productivity growth when interacted with industry nancial con-
straints. Hence, because our focus is primarily on productivity growth, we shall restrict our
empirical specication, consistent with the previous results and base our further investiga-
tions on the following specication:
gi;c = i + c +  (fci) (fpc)   log yti;c + "i;c: (6)
Based on this equation, we investigate the robustness of the e¤ect of countercyclical scal7
policy on industry growth. In particular, to what extent are our results driven by the exis-8
tence of omitted variables, by sample selection or by the choice of econometric methodology?9
5.1. Competing stories and omitted variables: Financial development.10
Is it possible that other factors or stories explain the correlation between industry growth11
and the cyclicality of scal policy? We now study a few alternative explanations. As noted12
above, the empirical methodology used in this paper was originally developed to test the e¤ect13
of nancial development on growth. Yet, the evidence provided so far shows that nancial14
development when interacted with industry nancial constraints does not seem to have much15
29Yet another limit relates to the relatively small number of countries in our sample. Because we focus
exclusively on developed countries and abstract from emerging and developing countries, the sample on
which we estimate the distribution quantiles for scal policy countercyclicality is relatively small.
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of a signicant e¤ect on labor productivity growth. To test this hypothesis more deeply, we1
consider three other alternative proxies for nancial development. In columns (i) to (iii) in2
Tables 3 and 4, nancial development is measured respectively by the ratio of bank credit to3
GDP, the ratio of domestic bank assets to GDP, and the real long-term interest rate. The4
rst of these measures is the restriction of private credit to its banking component, the second5
gives a measure of the stock of bank assets as opposed to the ow of credit, and the third6
measure gives an indication of the prevalent cost of capital in the economy. The empirical7
results show that none of these proxies when interacted with nancial dependence (Table8
3) or asset tangibility (Table 4) has a signicant e¤ect on labor productivity growth, which9
conrms the result obtained in the previous estimations. Moreover, neither the signicance10
nor the magnitude of the interaction term between nancial dependence/asset tangibility and11
the cyclicality of scal policy is a¤ected by controlling for these various measures of nancial12
development and their interactions with industry-level measures of nancial constraints. In13
other words, the e¤ect of scal policy cyclicality on industry growth remains unchanged14
both qualitatively and quantitatively once nancial development is controlled for these three15
di¤erent proxies. Yet, this does not mean that nancial development does not matter.16
However, our results suggest that, if it matters, it is primarily through its e¤ects on scal17
policy countercyclicality.18
5.2. Competing stories and omitted variables: Ination.19
Ination may also a¤ect productivity growth, particularly in more nancially dependent20
sectors. In particular, ination is widely perceived as having a negative impact on the21
allocative e¢ ciency of capital across sectors, the idea being that higher ination makes it22
more di¢ cult for investors to identify high-productivity projects. In this case, the higher the23
ination rate, the less e¢ ciently should the nancial system allocate capital across sectors.24
And, to the extent that those sectors that su¤er more from capital misallocation are the25
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more nancially dependent sectors, ination is more likely to have a negative e¤ect on1
productivity growth for industries with heavier reliance on external nance. In contrast, in2
industries with little or no nancial dependence, this negative e¤ect of ination is less likely3
to hold.30 Column (iv) in Table 3 indeed shows that the interaction of ination and nancial4
dependence is never a signicant determinant of labor productivity growth at industry level.5
The same applies to the interaction between ination and industry asset tangibility (see6
column (iv) in Table 4). Finally, we investigate whether this absence of any signicant e¤ect7
of ination could be related to the level of central bank policy rates, given that central banks8
tend to determine their policy rates according to ination gures (see column (v) in Tables9
3 and 4). However, even after central bank policy rates are controlled for, the interaction10
between scal policy cyclicality and industry nancial dependence/asset tangibility remains11
signicant. This suggests that the positive growth e¤ect of stabilizing scal policies in more12
nancially constrained industries is largely unrelated to average ination in a country: for a13
given ination rate, strengthening the countercyclical pattern of scal policy raises growth14
more in industries with higher nancial dependence or with lower asset tangibility. As15
previously seen, however, these results do not imply that high ination is not costly as it is16
likely to a¤ect the governments ability to carry out a stabilizing scal policy.17
5.3. Competing stories and omitted variables: Fiscal discipline and size of government.18
If the cyclical component of scal policy does signicantly a¤ect industry value added19
growth or labor productivity growth, it is likely that the permanent component of scal20
policy could play a similar role. In fact, it could be the case that countercyclical scal policy21
is positively correlated with industry growth not so much because countercyclicality per se22
is growth-enhancing but rather because a more countercyclical scal policy reects a more23
30A reinforcing consideration is that increases in short-term interest rates by central banks in response to
higher ination or higher than expected ination should also have a negative e¤ect on industry value added
and productivity growth and this e¤ect should be larger for industries with higher nancial dependence or
lower asset tangibility.
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stringent degree of scal discipline over the cycle. In the same vein, the cyclicality of scal1
policy might be a proxy for the relative size of government. To address this potential objec-2
tion, we consider four controls for di¤erent scal institutional characteristics: average scal3
balance, average government expenditures, average government revenues and average gross4
government debt. The rst measure captures scal discipline, the second and third measures5
capture the relative size of government, while the fourth measure represents both the relative6
size of the government as well as the debt burden that can hinder scal policy countercycli-7
cality. Columns (vi)(ix) in Tables 3 and 4 show that in the horse race between the cyclicality8
of scal policy and these four measures of structural scal policy, countercyclicality in the9
primary scal balance is a signicant determinant of industry growth irrespective of the con-10
trol variable considered. Moreover, none of these controls shows a signicant e¤ect in the11
interaction with nancial dependence or asset tangibility. This does not imply that scal12
discipline, for example as reected through a moderate average scal decit, does not matter13
for industry growth: tighter scal discipline should actually make it easier for a government14
to implement a more countercyclical scal policy whereas large average scal decits should15
make it harder for any government to stabilize the economy in downturns, particularly if the16
government faces a borrowing constraint.17
5.4. Dealing with the variability in scal cyclicality estimates.18
An important limitation to the empirical analysis carried out so far is that scal policy19
countercyclicality cannot be directly observed: instead, it can only be inferred through an20
auxiliary regression. This raises a number of issues, among them the fact that countercycli-21
cality is measured with a standard error. Hence our estimates can provide only a "noisy"22
signal of scal policy countercyclicality for each country. This problem can be dealt in two23
possible ways.3124
31In other words, the analysis exposed in this subsection is meant to rule out the possibility that our above
ndings might simply reect that the standard error around the estimates of scal policy counter-cyclicality
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A rst approach is to reproduce the uncertainty surrounding our scal policy estimates
and to check whether it a¤ects the results of our second stage regression. More precisely, we
adopt the following three-step procedure. First, instead of considering the average coe¢ cient
fpc estimated in the rst stage regression as an explanatory variable in our second stage
regression, we draw for each country c a scal policy cyclicality index fpic from a normal
distribution with mean fpc and standard deviation fpc , where fpc is the standard error for
the coe¢ cient fpc estimated in the rst stage regression. Typically the larger the estimated
standard deviation fpc , the more likely the scal policy cyclicality index fpic for country c
will be di¤erent from the average coe¢ cient fpc. Secondly we run the second stage regression
using the randomly drawn scal policy cyclicality indexes fpic:
gi;c = i + c +  (fci) (fpic)   log yti;c + "i;c (7)
Running this regression yields an estimated coe¢ cient  and an estimated standard deviation1
. We repeat this same procedure 2000 times, and thereby obtain a series of (2000) estimated2
coe¢ cients  and standard errors . As a last step, we average across all draws to obtain3
an average  of estimated coe¢ cients and  of estimated standard errors. The statistical4
signicance can eventually be tested on the basis of the averages  and . The results of5
this estimation procedure are shown in Table 5. The interaction of scal policy cyclicality6
and industry nancial constraints (either nancial dependence or asset tangibility) still has7
a signicant e¤ect on industry growth. The estimated parameter is slightly smaller than its8
counterpart in the simple OLS regression in Table 2. However the di¤erence is by no means9
statistically signicant. Hence neither the signicance nor the magnitude of our main e¤ect10
appear to be related to a possible bias stemming from the use of a generated regressor. In11
other words, the simple OLS regression does not seem to provide signicantly biased results.12
has not been properly taken into account.
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5.5. Instrumental variable estimation1
A second approach to dealing with the uncertainty surrounding our scal policy estimates2
is to perform instrumental variable estimations, considering the second stage regression as3
a model with errors-in-variables in which we observe only a noisy signal of the explanatory4
variable(s). Here we instrument scal policy countercyclicality using a set of instrumental5
variables that share two basic characteristics. First, these variables are directly observed;6
none is inferred from another model or regression. Second, these variables are all predeter-7
mined: that is, the period over which the instrumental variables are observed is prior to8
the time interval over which the auxiliary regressions that determine our countercyclicality9
measure are being run. More specically, we perform two alternative sets of IV estima-10
tions. In the rst set, the instruments are "economic" variables, for example, GDP per11
worker, the ratio of imports to GDP, CPI ination, nominal long-term interest rate, nominal12
short-term interest rate, private credit to GDP, nancial system deposits to GDP. In the13
second set of IV estimations, the instruments are legal and political variables: legal origin14
(English, French, German, Scandinavian), district magnitude and an index for government15
centralization (ratio of central to general government expenditures).3216
Results are provided in Table 6 where estimations in columns (i)(iv) use "economic"17
instruments and estimations in columns (v)(viii) use "legal and political" instruments.18
Three main results emerge from this exercise. First, no matter which underlying scal19
policy indicator we consider, and no matter which type of instruments we use (economic or20
legal and political) a more countercyclical scal policy has an increasingly signicant positive21
e¤ect on industry growth as the degree of industry external nancial dependence rises or as22
industry asset tangibility falls in the IV regressions. Second, the e¤ects implied by the IV23
estimations are of comparable magnitude to those implied by the above OLS regressions:24
the interaction coe¢ cients are at least as large and often larger (in absolute value) in the IV25
32Data on countries legal origin are drawn from La Porta et al (1998) while other legal and political
variables are drawn from Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2002).
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estimations than in the OLS estimations.33 Finally, the Hansen test for instrument validity1
is always accepted at the 10% level.2
5.6. Asymmetry between booms and slumps3
Our theoretical argument relied on the assumption that credit constraints are more likely4
to bind in downturns. This implied that the interaction between rmscredit constraints5
and scal countercyclicality should become stronger during downturns. Table 7 tests this6
prediction by running the second stage regression separately for country-years where the out-7
put gap is respectively below its historical median for the corresponding country (columns8
(i)(iv)) and above its historical median (columns (v)(vi)) for the corresponding country.9
When credit constraints are (inversely) measured by asset tangibility of the corresponding10
sector in the US (columns (iii)(iv) and (vii)(viii)), the interaction coe¢ cients are signif-11
icant only when the output gap is below median. This conrms that countercyclical scal12
policy raises growth disproportionately for industries with low asset tangibility essentially by13
dampening the intensity of downturns. When credit constraints are measured by the external14
nancial dependence of the corresponding sector in the US (columns (i)(ii) and (v)(vi)),15
then the interaction coe¢ cients are larger when the output gap is below median. That they16
remain signicant when the output gap is above median may reect expectations-related17
e¤ects: for example, with higher taxes in booms rms may anticipate higher subsidies or18
lower taxes in subsequent slumps, which in turn should have a more positive e¤ect on their19
growth-enhancing investments, particularly for rms that are more credit-constrained.20
33Note that R-squared are much lower for IV than for OLS regressions. The reason has to do with the
country and industry dummies which are included in computing the R-squared in the OLS regressions but
not in the IV regressions.
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6. Conclusions1
Short-runmacroeconomic policy undertaken to smooth the business cycle can a¤ect2
long-run industry growth. Following the Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodology, the3
paper has focused on the interaction between credit constraints at the industry level (mea-4
sured either by external nancial dependence or by the negative of asset tangibility in US5
industries) and the cyclicality of scal policy at the country level, and assessed the impact of6
this interaction on industry value added and productivity growth. Using this methodology,7
which helps address potential endogeneity issues, we have provided evidence that a more8
countercyclical scal policy enhances value added and productivity growth more in more9
nancially constrained industries, i.e. in industries whose US counterparts are more depen-10
dent on external nance or display lower asset tangibility. This result appears to survive a11
number of robustness tests, in particular the inclusion of structural macroeconomic variables12
such as nancial development, ination and average scal decits. This, in turn, suggests13
either that the growth impact of the cyclical pattern of scal policy is of comparable (or even14
greater) importance to that of more structural features, or that the e¤ect of these structural15
features operates at least partly through their own e¤ects on the cyclicality of scal policy.16
The analysis in this paper suggests at least three avenues for future research. The rst17
would be to investigate which component of scal policy drives the relationship between18
industry growth and the cyclicality of scal policy. A second question is whether the above19
analysis can be transposed to monetary policy. A positive answer to this question would20
be all the more important as monetary policy can presumably be more easily modied over21
time than scal policy, although transmission lags may be larger for monetary than for scal22
policy. Finally comes the question of the determinants of countercyclical scal policy, and23
especially the institutional features or arrangements that foster or prevent countercyclicality.24
Answering this question will shed new light on the ongoing debate about the relationship25
between institutions and growth.26
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